COVID-19 and Social Distancing in the Absence of Legal Enforcement: Survey Evidence from Japan by Shoji, Masahiro et al.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
COVID-19 and Social Distancing in the
Absence of Legal Enforcement: Survey
Evidence from Japan
Shoji, Masahiro and Cato, Susumu and Iida, Takashi and
Ishida, Kenji and Ito, Asei and McElwain, Kenneth
University of Tokyo
28 May 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/100723/
MPRA Paper No. 100723, posted 28 May 2020 17:15 UTC
1 
 
COVID-19 and Social Distancing in the Absence of Legal Enforcement:  
Survey Evidence from Japan 
 
Masahiro Shoji, Susumu Cato, Takashi Iida, Kenji Ishida, Asei Ito, and Kenneth Mori 
McElwain 
Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo 
Abstract 
Do people keep social distance to mitigate the infection risk of COVID-19, even without 
aggressive policy interventions? The Japanese government did not restrict individuals’ 
activities despite the early confirmation of infections, and as a result, economic damages 
were limited in the initial stage of infection spread. Exploiting these features, we examine 
the association between the subsequent increase in infections and voluntary social-
distancing behavior. Using unique monthly panel survey data, we find that the increase 
in risk is associated with the likelihood of social-distancing behavior. However, those 
with lower educational attainment are less responsive, implying their higher exposure to 
infections. We provide evidence that this can be attributed to their underestimation of 
infection risk, while we cannot fully rule out the roles of income opportunity costs and 
poor information access. These results suggest the utility of interventions incorporating 
nudges to raise risk perception, as well as financial support for low-income households. 
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1. Introduction 
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused immense human losses worldwide. To mitigate the 
infection spread, it is essential for individuals to maintain appropriate social or physical 
distance from one another (Fenichel, 2013; Fenichel et al., 2011; Ipsen, 1959).1 However, 
it can be difficult to achieve sufficient levels of distancing through voluntary individual 
compliance alone, because of its economic costs and uncertainties about transmission 
risk.2 Therefore, many governments have sought to enforce social distancing through 
various interventions, such as closing public transportation and workplaces, making viral 
or antibody tests available to anybody, and providing financial support (Hale et al. 2020). 
However, an obvious concern regarding aggressive regulations is their economic 
consequences (Acemoglu et al., 2020; Inoue and Todo, 2020; Lin and Meissner, 2020). 
In the United States, the unemployment rate has jumped from 4.4% in March 2020 to 
14.7% in April. Therefore, some countries have begun to lift social distancing 
requirements to restart economic activities, generating a new argument about whether 
governments can cope with the next wave of infections without relying on costly 
regulations. However, to the best of our knowledge, the extent to which individuals 
maintain social distance in the absence of aggressive regulation remains largely 
unexplored. 
 This study bridges this knowledge gap by examining the case of Japan during 
 
1 Social distancing or physical distancing is defined as the practice of keeping physical 
space between oneself and other people outside of the home. This includes staying at 
least six feet from other people, not gathering in groups, staying out of crowded places, 
and avoiding mass gatherings (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020). 
2 Decision-making under uncertainty is subject to various cognitive biases (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1972). In particular, the normalcy bias causes people to underestimate the 
probability and severity of transmission risk. 
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the initial phase of the COVID-19 infection spread. The Japanese government was less 
interventionist than other countries, in that it did not restrict residents’ activities or provide 
financial support. Reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) tests were 
not made widely available. Rather, the government simply requested that citizens 
maintain social distance and stay home voluntarily. Exploiting these features, this study 
analyzes the extent to which social-distancing behavior—such as face-to-face 
conversation, use of public transportation, and dining outside—changed with the increase 
in infection risk between January and March 2020, before the government announced a 
state of emergency on April 7th. This study also uncovers obstacles to social-distancing 
behavior, such as income opportunity costs, poor access to information, and 
underestimation of transmission risk. Disentangling these obstacles allows us to discuss 
the interactive roles between individuals’ responses and public policies. For example, if 
people do not modify their behavior due to the underestimation of infection risks, then 
interventions that elevate risk perceptions should mitigate the spread of COVID-19 
effectively, without the need for more drastic restrictions on activities. 
 Using original survey data, we regress changes in social-distancing behavior on 
the monthly average of confirmed cases per day in each prefecture, the main unit of 
subnational government in Japan. We discuss potential threats to identification carefully, 
particularly reverse causality and sample selection. Considering the absence of a natural 
experimental condition, it is difficult to fully rule out these possibilities. However, we 
provide evidence that these biases are unlikely to be severe, and if anything should work 
against our central hypotheses. 
 We find that the increase in the number of confirmed cases significantly 
encourages respondents to take social-distancing behavior. However, the effect is smaller 
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among socio-economically vulnerable individuals, particularly the less educated, 
implying that exposure to infections may not be equal across individuals. We also provide 
suggestive evidence that the heterogeneous impact is mainly attributable to differences in 
the perception of infection risk, although we cannot fully rule out the roles of income 
opportunity costs and poor information access. These results suggest the importance of 
interventions that incorporate nudges to heighten perceptions of risk, as well as financial 
support.  
This study is most closely related to Barrios and Hochberg (2020), who examine 
the impact of obtaining information about infection spread on perceptions of risk and 
social-distancing behavior in the U.S. A key distinction between this study and theirs is 
that their work analyzes social distancing after the government started to restrict residents’ 
activities in the U.S., while we study Japan before the government intervened. The 
findings of this study are also in line with those of Muto et al. (2020) and Machida et al. 
(2020) that examine social distancing in Japan, Kushner Gadarian et al. (2020) in the U.S., 
and Barari et al. (2020) in Italy. In particular, Muto et al. (2020) also find less behavioral 
change among those with lower socio-economic status, although they do not test the 
potential reasons for the heterogeneity.  
This study is also related to the literature of health inequality. Existing studies 
demonstrate the association between socio-economic status and health status (Balia and 
Jones, 2008; Cutler et al., 2008; Doorslaer et al., 2004; Kawachi et al., 2010; Williams et 
al., 1997; Winkleby et al., 1992). Researchers consider this relationship to be mediated 
by differences in health behavior, access to health care, exposure to health risk, and stress 
(Adler and Newman, 2002; Kristenson et al., 2004; Maurer, 2009). Others argue that 
knowledge and perception of health risk play pivotal roles in predicting health behavior, 
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such as smoking, substance abuse, purchase of health insurance, immunization, and 
disaster evacuation (Apostolidis et al., 2006; Lin and Sloan, 2015; Lundborg and 
Andersson, 2008; Riad et al., 2006; Schaller et al., 2019; Zhou-Richter et al., 2010). In 
line with these works, our data support the hypothesis that differences in the perception 
and knowledge of health risks across education levels cause the heterogeneity in health 
behavior. 
 The rest of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the infection 
spread and government responses in Japan. Sections 3 and 4 describe the dataset and 
identification strategy, respectively. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 disentangles 
the obstacles to social-distancing behavior, and finally Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
2.1. Infection Spread of COVID-19 in Japan (January to March 24th, 2020) 
On December 31st in 2019, the WHO China Country Office was informed of cases of 
pneumonia of unknown causes in Wuhan City, China. Due to its geographical proximity 
to China and frequent bilateral travel for tourism and business, Japan was one of the 
earliest countries to confirm COVID-19 cases outside of China, following Thailand 
(WHO, 2020). According to the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (MHLW), the 
first case in Japan was confirmed on January 15th, 2020 in Kanagawa, a region in the 
suburb of Tokyo, and 15 more cases were reported by the end of January (Figure 1).3 
Most of these cases (13 out of 16) were attributed to visitors and returnees from China. 
The first report of human-to-human transmission, however, appeared in January 28th in 
 
3 The information on the number of confirmed cases is available from the MHLW 
website (https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/index.html, accessed on May 6th, 2020). 
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Nara, a tourist site in western Japan. 
[Figure 1] 
        In February, the virus gradually and silently spread in several rural prefectures 
in addition to large cities. By February 10th, 28 cases had been confirmed, of which 15 
were Japanese residents.4 Infection of medical workers began to appear in the second 
half of the month. Serious cluster cases were also found in late February, including the 
participants of a snow festival in Hokkaido, the northern-most prefecture of Japan. By the 
end of February, a total of 239 cases were reported, of which 69 were in Hokkaido. 
However, more than half of the 47 prefectures had not yet confirmed any cases, and even 
populated prefectures, such as Miyagi and Osaka, had found only a few cases (Figure 2).  
[Figure 2] 
 Infection spread accelerated in March. More populated prefectures started to find 
new cases regularly, and over 10 prefectures announced their first cases in the first week 
of March. While about 30 cases were found nationwide each day until the 9th, a big jump 
occurred on the 10th, when 70 cases were reported. Around the same time, fatalities from 
COVID-19 started being reported regularly.  
 
2.2. Government Response and Economic Consequences 
Despite the confirmation of infected citizens earlier than most countries, the national 
government’s response was comparatively passive. It gradually tightened immigration 
controls to visitors from Hubei Province, China, and also asked Japanese residents in 
Wuhan to come back to Japan in the beginning of February. However, in stark contrast to 
 
4 Around the same time, passengers of the Diamond Princess, a cruise ship, tested 
positive, and the ship began to be quarantined from February 4th. Passengers and crew 
stayed on the ship for two weeks. 
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other countries which closed public transportation and workplaces, there was no legal 
regulation of residents’ activities in Japan. In fact, as late as early April, the prime minister 
emphasized that there was no need to declare a state of emergency and only requested 
self-restraint (Jishuku Yosei) in hosting or attending large-scale public events.5  
 The one exception was on February 27th, when the national government 
requested the closures of all elementary, junior, and senior high schools until the 
beginning of the new academic year in April. However, the final decision was left to the 
governor of each prefecture, and some prefectures did not close their schools. No 
restrictions were placed on economic activities. 
While the national government was cautious about declaring a state of 
emergency, several local governments took measures of their own. That said, these were 
also limited in the scope and time frame of regulated activities and, more importantly, 
lacked legal enforcement. On February 28th, the Governor of Hokkaido announced a state 
of emergency, although it lacked legal basis, and requested that residents avoid leaving 
their homes for three weeks.6 The Governor of Osaka also asked for the refrainment of 
movement to and from Hyogo, the neighboring prefecture, between March 20th and 22nd.  
 The low number of RT-PCR tests in Japan is also striking when compared to 
South Korea, which made drive-thru tests available to anyone, including asymptomatic 
 
5 The Constitution of Japan does not provide for a national state of emergency. As such, 
neither the national nor local governments has the formal authority to require business 
closures, shelter-in-place orders, or citywide lockdowns. However, amendments to the 
Infectious Diseases Control Law on March 13, 2020, newly allowed the Cabinet to 
declare a “soft” state of emergency, which delegates mores authority to prefectural 
governors to contain COVID-19. Even then, governors are restricted to urging (and if 
necessary shaming) businesses and citizens to follow its directives. The “state of 
emergency” referred to in this paper refers to this latter, softer variety. 
6 After this announcement, on March 13th, the National Diet (parliament) amended the 
law so that a state of emergency declaration could be issued. 
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people.7 There were two paths for Japanese residents to be tested as of March 2020. First, 
those who had “close contact” with an infected person were requested to visit a designated 
medical facility.8 Second, those who did not have close contact but suffered from severe 
symptoms could consult with their family doctor or local public health call center, who 
would then refer the patient to a designated facility, if considered necessary. Only those 
persons whom the facility suspected were infected could take a RT-PCR test, which was 
administered at public health centers or local public health institutions. Therefore, there 
was no way to detect asymptomatic infection except for those who had “close contact”. 
The accuracy of detecting infected people also depended on the screening ability of home 
doctors, call centers, and designated medical facilities. 
Because of these passive policy interventions, economic conditions in Japan did 
not decline as much as in other countries during the first quarter of 2020. Although the 
number of bankruptcies increased from 651 cases in February to 740 in March, as shown 
in Figure A1, only 12 cases were related to COVID-19 (Tokyo Shoko Research, 2020). 
The unemployment rate was also stable between January and March, in contrast to other 
countries experiencing a rapid increase in infections, such as the U.S. and Ireland (Figure 
A2). 
 
3. Data 
This study employs two datasets. First, to approximate the risk of COVID-19 infection, 
 
7 According to an MHLW report on May 4, 2020, the low number of tests was due to 
the limited capacities of call centers, testing facilities, and medical facilities 
(https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/10900000/000627553.pdf, accessed on May 10, 
2020).  
8 A person is categorized to be in close contact with infected persons if he/she (i) 
touches an infected person directly without anti-infective measures, or (ii) meets an 
infected person at a distance of around 2 meters (6 feet) or less. 
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we construct prefecture-level monthly panel data on the average number of newly 
confirmed cases per day. We use this information as the main independent variable, 
because the number of newly confirmed cases is reported daily by the government and 
mass media, and thus is the most easily accessible information for people regarding the 
infection spread. While the ratio of positive-to-negative RT-PCR tests is one alternative 
measure of infection risk, we do not use it for this analysis, because that information was 
not widely disseminated and thus unlikely to affect behavioral patterns at that time.  
Second, this study uses data from an original, nationwide online survey.9 The 
first round of the survey was conducted between March 25th and 27th, 2020. Because 
working-age individuals account for a high proportion of confirmed cases, our survey 
targeted those in their 30s and 40s. The sample size is 2,798. The questionnaire is 
designed to elicit information about both behavior and preferences, such as the use of 
social media, political sentiment, health status, actions taken to protect oneself and others 
from COVID-19, perceptions about the severity of infection risk, and the assessment of 
the government’s early responses to COVID-19. On April 27th to May 7th, we re-
surveyed the same respondents to collect further information on their social and 
psychological traits, such as civic attitudes and social capital, although we use it only in 
Section 6. A total of 2,462 individuals participated in both surveys. Table A1 presents the 
summary statistics of prefecture and respondent characteristics. Online Appendix A1 
discusses more details about the survey design, such as sampling methodology and 
 
9 A potential drawback to the use of online survey data is sample selection. However, 
we chose this approach because it was difficult to conduct a paper-and-pencil survey in 
a timely manner at that time. An alternative approach is to use publicly available data, 
such as the Google Trends interface and geolocation data from mobile phones (Barrios 
and Hochberg 2020). Although these may better capture behavioral changes, it is 
difficult to analyze the degree of and reasons for heterogeneity in behavior. 
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research ethics. 
The first-round survey data contain three behavioral variables related to social 
distancing, our outcome of interest. The first is frequency of face-to-face conversations 
per day. The second is the number of days per week that respondents used public 
transportation for more than one hour, capturing the frequency of commuting. Third, we 
use the frequency per week of dining outside.10 In this survey, retrospective information 
was collected, based on recall; the dataset contains the information on face-to-face 
conversations from December 2019 until March 2020, and on the other two variables 
from January to March 2020. From this retrospective information, a monthly pseudo-
panel dataset was compiled. Figure 3 depicts the trend of these variables.  
[Figure 3] 
 
4. Identification Strategy 
4.1. Estimation Model 
This study estimates the following OLS model: 
Ript = α0 + α1 Infpt + α2 Adj_Infpt+ α3 Damagept + δip + Tt + εipt, (1) 
where, Ript denotes the binary indicators of social-distancing behavior of individual i in 
prefecture p in month t. For face-to-face conversations, Ript takes unity if the individual 
talks with five people or more per day, and zero otherwise (roughly around the median). 
For public transportation and dining outside, it takes unity if the individual undertakes 
these activities at least once a week. Infpt denotes the monthly average of newly confirmed 
cases per day in the prefecture in which the respondent resides. Adj_Infpt denotes the 
 
10 The transmission risk from these activities depends on various factors, such as the 
use of masks and physical distance from others, but we did not ask such detailed 
questions to mitigate the respondents’ burdens and ensure a higher response rate. 
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summation of Inf over the adjacent prefectures, to account for high levels of cross-
prefectural movement in urban areas in particular. Damagept denotes proxies for the 
economic damages from the infection spread, such as the number of bankruptcies and the 
active job-openings-to-applicants ratio. Finally, δip and Tt denote respondent and monthly 
fixed effects, respectively. The respondent fixed effects control for those characteristics 
invariant between January and March 2020, including socio-economic conditions at the 
prefecture and individual levels. Monthly fixed effects capture the impact of country-level 
shocks, such as news about the infection spread in other countries and restrictions on 
overseas travel. 
 
4.2. Underlying Assumptions 
4.2.1. No Reverse Causality 
Our identification strategy relies on four assumptions. The first assumption is the absence 
of reverse causality. The residents’ (lack of) social-distancing behavior may affect the 
level of confirmed cases in the prefecture. However, this should cause an upward bias 
between risky behavior and COVID-19 infection counts. Hence, as long as we find a 
negative association between risky behavior and confirmed cases, it should not affect the 
interpretation of results. 
Furthermore, this issue is unlikely to be severe, because many whose infections 
were confirmed in March were likely to have been infected in the beginning of the month 
or even earlier. Symptoms generally develop 2 to 14 days following exposure to the virus 
(Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020). In addition, the Japanese government 
recommended home rest for a few days after becoming symptomatic to see whether the 
symptoms became serious. Only then were patients recommended to visit their home 
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doctor or consult a call center to be assessed whether they should go to a designated 
medical facility, as mentioned in Section 2. Therefore, there is often a significant time lag 
between exposure to the virus and confirmation of the diagnosis.  
It should be noted that the Japanese government has identified that at least 70% 
of newly confirmed cases between March 1st and 24th were transmitted by those who 
were previously confirmed.11 Therefore, the increase in the confirmed cases in this 
period was mainly determined by the behavioral patterns of previously confirmed people 
(only 0.0002% of national population). 12  The social-distancing behavior of most 
respondents should have played a limited role in the increases in confirmed cases. 
 
4.2.2. Parallel Trend Assumption 
The second is the parallel trend assumption, which may be subject to the following two 
issues. First, the number of confirmed cases may grow faster in urban prefectures, which 
have greater testing capacity and population density, and these characteristics may be 
correlated with changes in social-distancing behavior. However, in the time period under 
observation, we would expect less social distancing in urban areas, causing an upward 
bias (less social distancing where there are more infections) that runs counter to our 
hypothesis (more social distancing where there are more infection). The frequencies of 
conversing with colleagues, commuting, and dining out are expected to increase in March, 
particularly in large cities, because March is the final month of the fiscal year and work 
 
11 The Japanese government identifies the channel of transmission based on interviews 
with confirmed patients. The data on confirmed cases by transmission channels are 
available from https://datastudio.google.com/reporting/c4e0fe88-f72e-464e-a3b8-
5e4e591c238d/page/ultJB?s=oA3tV-uQzaE (accessed on May 8, 2020). 
12 As of the end of February 2020, only 206 cases were confirmed, compared to the 
national population of 126 million. 
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hours generally increase. The Statistics Bureau of Japan (2020) finds that in 2018 and 
2019, the revenues of restaurant business increased in March.  
Furthermore, as mentioned in Section 4.2.1, the infection spread in March was 
mainly attributed to the unwitting behavior of infected persons before their diagnosis was 
confirmed, such as the frequency of going to bars before becoming symptomatic. 
Therefore, the socio-economic environment of the prefecture should have played a 
limited role in the increase in confirmed cases in March, if at all. 
 The second potential violation of the parallel trend assumption is that, if the 
timing of infection spread is controllable or predictable, people can prepare for it 
beforehand. Therefore, they may alter their behavior even in the pre-spread period. 
However, this is also unlikely because it is difficult to predict the timing that infections 
spread accurately. More importantly, these possibilities also attenuate the estimated effect 
of infection risk, i.e. the results would be biased against finding statistically significant 
results. Therefore, it should not affect the interpretation of results qualitatively, as long as 
we find a significantly negative effect. 
To examine the validity of the parallel trend assumption, we conduct a 
falsification test by regressing Ript (social distancing behavior) between December and 
February on the individual fixed effects, monthly fixed effects, and interaction terms 
between monthly fixed effects and the number of confirmed cases in March. Table A2 
shows that the coefficients of interaction terms are statistically jointly insignificant and 
small in magnitude for all the columns.  
One may also be concerned about the ceiling effect. If the level of Ript in February 
is already low (i.e. high level of social distancing) in prefectures that subsequently had 
few confirmed cases in March, then Ript in March may be less likely to decrease even 
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further than in prefectures with more cases, regardless of the severity of infection spread. 
We test this possibility by regressing the level of Ript in February on the number of 
confirmed cases in March. The coefficients are -0.003 (p-value=0.440) for face-to-face 
conversations, 0.060 (p-value=0.000) for the use of public transportation, and 0.009 (p-
value=0.314) for dining out. Hence, the data show that the ceiling effect is negligible for 
the frequencies of face-to-face conversation and dining outside.  
 
4.2.3. Limited Impact of Economic Damage and Government Intervention 
The third underlying assumption for this model is that the increase in the number of 
confirmed cases affects individual behavior only through the increase in infection risk, 
but not through associated economic damages or government interventions. This 
assumption is likely to hold: as mentioned in Section 2, economic indicators, such as the 
unemployment rate and number of bankruptcies, were still stable during the survey period. 
Furthermore, using the prefecture-level monthly panel data, we find that the number of 
confirmed cases is not associated with bankruptcy cases or the active job-openings-to-
applicants ratio (Table A3). Finally, our econometric specification controls for these 
economic conditions.  
Regarding government interventions, after the prime minister recommended that 
local governors close schools in March, respondents with a schooling-age child may have 
had to stay home to take care of their children. To rule out this impact, we re-estimate the 
model after excluding respondents with a schooling-age child. In addition, we also drop 
the sample from Hokkaido prefecture, which unilaterally closed schools and encouraged 
residents to shelter in place, in order to eliminate the effects of imposing a state of 
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emergency.13  
 
4.2.4. Limited Spillover Effect 
The fourth potential threat to our identification strategy is the spillover effect from other 
prefectures. A spike in COVID-19 cases in one prefecture may elevate perceived risks 
among residents of neighboring prefectures, motivating them to maintain social distance. 
This is particularly plausible for those who commute to adjacent prefectures for work. To 
address this potential issue, we control for the number of confirmed cases in the adjacent 
prefectures, Adj_Infpt, in the model. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Benchmark Results 
Table 1 presents the OLS results of Equation (1). It shows that the increase in confirmed 
cases is significantly associated with social-distancing behavior. As prefecture-level 
COVID-19 cases increase, people reduce face-to-face conversations, the usage of public 
transportation, and dining out. Furthermore, compared to the naïve models (Columns (1), 
(5), and (9)), the association becomes substantively larger after controlling for economic 
conditions (Columns (2), (6), and (10)). The results are also robust to the additional 
control for confirmed cases in adjacent prefectures (Columns (3), (7), and (11)) and the 
exclusion of respondents with a schooling-age child (Columns (4), (8), and (12)). 
Columns (4) and (8) show that a one standard deviation increase in COVID-19 cases 
(S.D.=1.9) is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of talking with more than five 
 
13 We do not exclude the sample of Osaka because the request to refrain from cross-
prefecture movement was only in place for three days. 
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people per day and using public transportation by 1.5 and 1.3 percentage points, 
respectively. Column (12) demonstrates an insignificant coefficient, but the point estimate 
is still stable. Hence, changes in economic conditions or government interventions cannot 
explain the significantly negative coefficients of confirmed cases.  
With regard to other coefficients, it is suggestive that the increase in confirmed 
cases in adjacent prefectures has a negative effect on commuting behavior. This is 
presumably driven by respondents who commute across prefectural borders. The 
coefficients of the job-opening-to-applicants ratio are negative. Although this is purely 
speculative, this result may be because a higher ratio enables individuals to select a job 
with better working conditions. 
We conduct the following robustness checks. First, people may react to the 
accumulated number of confirmed cases over multiple months, rather than the number of 
newly confirmed cases in the most recent month. Hence, as an alternative measure of 
infection risk, we re-estimate the model using the accumulated number of confirmed cases 
(Table A4). Second, behavioral patterns may differ between employed and unemployed 
persons, because of differences in the need to use public transportation and have face-to-
face conversation. They may also differ in terms of budget constraint for dining outside. 
To control for these heterogeneities, we re-estimate our models after excluding 
respondents who do not work (Table A5). Third, our survey originally elicited information 
on social-distancing behavior as an ordinal variable (Figure 3), but we converted these 
into binary indicators for the panel data analysis. In Table A6, we use the original 
categorical values as the dependent variable and re-estimate the models using interval 
regressions and ordered probit models. The results are robust to all of these alternative 
specifications.  
17 
 
[Table 1] 
 
5.2. Heterogeneous Effect 
Does the impact of infection risk vary across individuals? In Table 2, we address this 
question by adding interaction terms between confirmed cases and respondent 
characteristics. We also control for month-prefecture fixed effects rather than the monthly 
fixed effects. These models demonstrate significant differences by education level. 
Columns (1), (3), and (5) suggest that the impact of a one standard deviation increase in 
confirmed cases is larger for university graduates by 1.7, 2.9, and 2.1 percentage points, 
respectively, than for high school graduates.  
 Regarding other characteristics, first, we find a difference in the frequency of 
dining outside by gender. Second, the coefficient of interaction with respondents’ age is 
statistically insignificant for most columns and small in magnitude, presumably because 
our sample consists only of those in their 30s and 40s. Finally, those with a schooling-age 
child are less likely to eat out, given the increase in infection risk. 
[Table 2] 
 
6. Suggestive Evidence on the Mechanisms of Heterogeneous Impact 
Why are less educated people less sensitive to the risks of COVID-19 infection? We test 
eight potential mechanisms. First, they may engage in a job that is not suitable for 
teleworking, such as in retail or the restaurant business. Second, their economic status 
may be lower, and so they may suffer from credit constraints. Therefore, the disutility 
from the income loss caused by staying home is larger than for the wealthy. The third 
potential mechanism is that they may not watch television news or read newspapers, and 
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therefore have poorer knowledge of COVID-19. Fourth, even if they have knowledge, 
they may still underestimate the infection risk. Because the actual number of infected 
individuals is unobservable, people infer the infection risk from the information available, 
but news related to COVID-19 frequently includes professional, foreign language terms 
(e.g. RT-PCR tests). Fifth, they may be less risk averse. Sixth, they may possess less social 
capital than university graduates, and so may care less about their reputation or 
disapproval from neighbors. Seventh, they may take alternative actions to protect 
themselves, such as wearing masks and washing hands with disinfectants. Finally, they 
may recognize that the number of confirmed cases underestimates the actual infection 
risk, and therefore, they may react to other types of information, such as the ratio of 
positive RT-PCR tests. Among these, the first to fourth channels suggest that the less 
educated do not maintain social distance due to some constraints, whereas the fifth and 
sixth mechanisms imply that they do not keep social distance by intention. These six 
mechanisms suggest that the less educated are exposed to higher infection risks, and thus 
could be unwitting but significant vectors of COVID-19. 
To test the relevance of the first channel—the unsuitability of certain jobs for 
teleworking—we construct an industry-level proxy using the survey results of Okubo and 
NIRA (2020). Based on an online survey in Japan, this study shows the proportion of 
respondents working at home by industry as of March 2020. We combine these 
proportions and our respondents’ occupation to approximate the suitability of their jobs 
for teleworking.14  Then, we regress it on the respondent characteristics to examine 
whether less educated respondents actually engage in a job unsuitable for telework. 
Column (1) of Table 3, however, shows that the coefficient for university graduate is 
 
14 The summary statistics of variables used for this section are presented in Table A1.  
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negative, counter to the hypothesis.15  
Second, to examine the channel through income opportunity costs, we conduct 
a principal component analysis to construct a composite index of economic status from 
two variables: annual income, and a binary indicator that takes unity for self-employment, 
executive, or regular employment. We examine the correlation between this index and 
education level in Column (2) of Table 3. It confirms that the economic status of 
university graduates is significantly higher than that for high school graduates, in line 
with our hypothesis. 
 To test the third channel through information access, we construct a composite 
index from three variables: the frequencies of reading paper newspapers, reading 
newspaper websites, and watching television news. Then, we estimate the association 
between education level and the index in Column (3). The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis: educated respondents follow the mass media more frequently. 
 The fourth channel is underestimation of infection risk. We construct a composite 
index of risk perception using the following three questions: how many infected people 
they think there actually are in Japan; the extent to which COVID-19 will cause serious 
problems for themselves; whether the COVID-19 situation will be even worse after six 
months. The regression result in Column (4) shows that educated people are more likely 
to take the infection risk more seriously, supporting our hypothesis.  
 Fifth, given the difficulty in conducting an economic experiment to elicit the risk 
preference of respondents in our online survey, we test this channel through two proxy 
variables. First, we asked the following question: which of the following two sayings 
 
15 Okubo and NIRA (2020) also report the proportion of teleworking at the pre-spread 
period (January 2020). Changing the time period for telework suitability does not affect 
our results. 
20 
 
characterizes you better, “nothing ventured, nothing gained” or “a wise man never courts 
danger”? The answer options are in Likert-scale. Second, we also asked the following 
question: at which precipitation probability do you go out with an umbrella? A lower 
score to these answers indicates greater risk aversion. These questions are frequently used 
in the literature (Ikeda et al. 2016 p142; Iida 2016) and draws from earlier work in the 
United States. In Column (5), we estimate the relationship between the composite index 
of these variables and respondent characteristics, showing that education level is 
uncorrelated with risk preference. 
 Sixth, the second wave of our survey asks about respondents’ social capital 
through six questions on general trust, pure altruism, and social norms. More detail about 
each question is reported in Table A1. We use these answers to construct a composite 
index. Column (6) demonstrates that social capital is lower for less educated respondents, 
supporting the hypothesis. 
 Seventh, although our survey does not include items on the use of facemasks or 
disinfectant soap, it does ask respondents whether they wished to buy them more than 
usual. We regress the composite index of these variables in Column (7). The result shows 
that highly educated individuals are more likely to answer affirmatively, counter to the 
hypothesis. 
 The eighth hypothesis pertains to respondents having less confidence of the 
confirmed number of infections cases as a proxy for infection risk. This hypothesis 
assumes that those with lower education have more knowledge about COVID-19 than 
educated respondents. This assumption, however, contradicts our findings that less 
educated respondents spend less time collecting information on COVID-19 (Table 3, 
Column (3)). 
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 These results so far show that respondents’ education levels are associated with 
economic status, information access, risk perception, and social capital. The observed 
patterns are robust to the full sample estimation (Table A7). These characteristics could 
be potential drivers of the heterogeneous effect of COVID-19 cases. To further test 
whether they are also associated with their social-distancing behavior, we additionally 
control for the interaction terms between these seven indices and the number of confirmed 
cases, based on the specifications in Table 2.  
Table 4 presents the results. We find that in prefectures with many confirmed 
cases, those with high risk perception reduce the frequency of face-to-face conversations 
and dining out. Economic status and information access are also correlated with the 
frequency of commuting, but the results are not robust to the change in the sample. The 
interaction term for social capital has negative coefficients for most columns, but they are 
statistically insignificant. Intriguingly, the suitability of their jobs for teleworking is 
negatively associated with the frequency of commuting, as expected, but it is uncorrelated 
with the education level (Table 3). Overall, the results from Tables 3 and 4 support the 
hypothesis that differences in risk perception are the most likely driver of heterogeneity 
across education levels, whereas we cannot fully rule out the roles of income opportunity 
costs and information access. 
Finally, if the heterogeneous effect across education levels is mediated by these 
differences in behavior and perception, the coefficient for university graduates should 
become smaller after controlling for them. However, we cannot directly compare the 
coefficient with that of Table 2, because some observations are dropped due to missing 
values in Table 4. Therefore, in Table A8 we re-estimate the model of Table 2 using the 
sample of Table 4. It shows that in the full sample model (odd-numbered columns), the 
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coefficient of Table 4 is smaller by 25%, 17%, and 80%, respectively.  
[Table 3] 
[Table 4] 
 
7. Conclusion 
Do people keep social distance to mitigate the infection risk of COVID-19, even in the 
absence of aggressive government intervention? Using unique survey data collected in 
Japan, we find that an increase in the number of confirmed cases is negatively associated 
with the frequency of face-to-face conversation, public transportation use, and dining out. 
However, less educated people do not respond as much as those with higher education. 
We provide suggestive evidence that this heterogeneity is driven primarily by the former’s 
underestimation of infection risk, although we cannot fully rule out the roles of income 
opportunity costs and information access. 
 The following policy implication can be derived. Some countries have lifted 
aggressive regulations before eliminating new COVID-19 infections in order to restart 
economic activities, but concerns remain about how governments will cope with the next 
wave of infections (Acemoglu et al., 2020; Inoue and Todo, 2020; Lin and Meissner, 
2020). Our findings suggest that when the government prioritizes economic activities, 
socio-economically vulnerable individuals are exposed to particularly higher risk, and 
they could also become the primary vectors of the virus. This is consistent with the 
argument of Ahmed et al. (2020). It is, therefore, incumbent upon the government to 
implement a targeted intervention for this subpopulation promptly.  
One approach is for governments to provide financial compensation to those 
experiencing economic hardship. This could be effective if three obstacles are mutually 
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related: low income causes poor information access, which in turn affects perceptions of 
infection risk. However, this may not be enough to stop the infection spread. It may also 
be important to provide information on the risks of infection transmission in an easily 
accessible and understandable manner. Another promising approach is interventions that 
incorporate nudges to elevate risk perceptions. Van Bavel et al. (2020) argue in favor of 
nudges in eradicating COVID-19. Whether these policies—providing more information 
or financial compensation—are complements or substitutes in encouraging social-
distancing behavior depend on how risk perception and health knowledge are formed. 
Further studies are required to design the optimal combination of these policies. 
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Note: The passengers and crew of the Diamond Princess are not included. 
Source: MHLW (https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/index.html) 
Figure 1: Infection Spread in Japan 
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Note: The passengers and crew of the Diamond Princess are not included. 
Source: MHLW (https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/index.html) 
Figure 2: Cumulative Number of Confirmed Cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
29 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3: Trend of Social-Distancing Behavior 
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Table 1: The Impact of Infection Spread on Social-Distancing Behavior 
 Conversation Sample: All All All No child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Confirmed cases -0.007** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) Confirmed cases   0.001 0.002 
   in adjacent prefectures   (0.002) (0.003) 
Bankruptcy cases  0.371 0.370 0.220 
  (0.281) (0.281) (0.335) 
Job-openings- to-applicants ratio  -0.164** -0.173*** -0.123 
     (0.066) (0.066) (0.080) 
Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.518 0.518 0.518 0.486 
Observations 10,439 10,439 10,439 7,299 
Number of respondents 2,613 2,613 2,613 1,827 
 Commute Sample: All All All No child 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Confirmed cases -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.006** -0.007** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) Confirmed cases   -0.005*** -0.005** 
   in adjacent prefectures   (0.002) (0.002) 
Bankruptcy cases  0.283 0.300 0.531 
  (0.359) (0.359) (0.413) 
Job-openings- to-applicants ratio  -0.172** -0.137* -0.191** 
     (0.080) (0.078) (0.096) 
Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.235 0.235 0.235 0.249 
Observations 7,799 7,799 7,799 5,458 
Number of respondents 2,619 2,619 2,619 1,832 
 Dining Sample: All All All No child 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Confirmed cases -0.006* -0.007** -0.005* -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) Confirmed cases   -0.002 -0.003 
   in adjacent prefectures   (0.002) (0.003) 
Bankruptcy cases  0.457 0.464 0.630 
  (0.431) (0.430) (0.451) 
Job-openings- to-applicants ratio  -0.009 0.006 -0.032 
     (0.094) (0.093) (0.098) 
Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.458 0.458 0.458 0.464 
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Observations 7,855 7,855 7,855 5,494 
Number of respondents 2,624 2,624 2,624 1,835 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Heterogeneous Effect 
  Conversation Commute Dining 
Sample: All No child All No child All No child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Confirmed cases -0.009* -0.013** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.011** -0.003 
  x University (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Confirmed cases -0.009 -0.015** -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 0.001 
  x Vocational (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Confirmed cases -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
  x Age (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Confirmed cases -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.017*** -0.011** 
  x Female (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Confirmed cases -0.004  0.000  -0.015**  
 x Live with schooling-age child (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  
Month-Prefecture Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.518 0.486 0.235 0.249 0.458 0.464 
Observations 10,192 7,203 7,619 5,389 7,665 5,422 
Number of respondents 2,551 1,803 2,556 1,807 2,559 1,810 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3: The Relationship Between Education and Socio-Economic Indices 
(Samples with no schooling-age child) 
 
Suitability 
of job for 
teleworking 
Economic 
status 
Information 
access 
Risk 
perception 
Risk 
preference 
Social 
capital 
Alternative 
protective 
measures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
University  -0.101*** 0.780*** 0.231*** 0.145** 0.040 0.607*** 0.220*** 
 (0.024) (0.064) (0.077) (0.062) (0.045) (0.084) (0.062) Vocational -0.048 0.306*** 0.189*** 0.021 0.051 0.494*** 0.278*** 
 (0.035) (0.076) (0.066) (0.087) (0.076) (0.093) (0.072) Age  -0.001 -0.005* 0.028*** 0.009** -0.002 -0.001 -0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) Female  0.157*** -0.534*** -0.157*** -0.073 -0.268*** 0.339*** 0.497*** 
 (0.021) (0.059) (0.056) (0.046) (0.044) (0.071) (0.059) Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,468 1,586 1,798 1,784 1,790 1,454 1,787 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are in 
parentheses. The sample sizes of Columns (1) and (6) are smaller than the others, because 
the data on respondents’ occupation and social capital were collected in the second-wave 
survey. Column (2) also has a small sample size due to missing values in the annual 
income data. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: The Relationship Between Socio-Economic Indices and Social-Distancing 
Behavior 
  Conversation Commute Dining 
Sample: All No child All No child All No child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Confirmed cases -0.009 -0.016 -0.024** -0.025* -0.009 -0.002 
  x Suitability of job for teleworking (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Confirmed cases -0.002 -0.004 -0.005* -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 
  x Economic status (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Confirmed cases 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004* -0.003 -0.004 
x Information access (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Confirmed cases -0.005** -0.007** -0.002 -0.003 -0.006** -0.004* 
  x Risk perception (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Confirmed cases -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.005* -0.004 
  x Risk preference (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Confirmed cases -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
  x Social capital (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Confirmed cases -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  x Alternative protective measures (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Confirmed cases -0.009 -0.012* -0.010* -0.015** -0.001 0.006 
  x University (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Confirmed cases -0.015* -0.020** -0.010 -0.010 -0.002 0.006 
  x Vocational (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Confirmed cases -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001* 0.000 -0.000 
  x Age (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Confirmed cases -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.024*** -0.014** 
  x Female (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Confirmed cases -0.013*  -0.001  -0.018**    x Live with schooling-age child (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.009)  Month-Prefecture Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.530 0.495 0.244 0.260 0.465 0.471 
Observations 6,912 4,897 5,175 3,670 5,196 3,684 
Number of respondents 1,738 1,230 1,739 1,232 1,740 1,233 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are 
in parentheses. The sample size is smaller than Table 2, because the data on respondents’ 
occupation and social capital were collected in the second-wave survey. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Online Appendices  
Appendix 1: Further Discussion on the Survey Design 
Our survey targeted those in their 30s and 40s because working-age individuals account 
for the high proportion among the confirmed cases. Respondents were recruited by 
Rakuten Insight, which has 2.2 million registrations. Among them, we conducted a quota 
sampling with regard to gender (two categories), age group (four 5-year categories), and 
location of residence (10 categories), so that the distribution of these characteristics 
becomes comparable to that of the Japanese population. The respondents received some 
token for shopping at Rakuten.com as financial incentive. After dropping the sample of 
Hokkaido prefecture, the sample size is 2,637 for the first round, of which 2,293 
participated in both rounds. We obtained informed consent from the respondents. This 
survey was approved by Research Ethics Committee of the Institute of Social Science in 
the University of Tokyo.  
 Table A1 presents the summary statistics of respondent characteristics. Among 
employed workers, temporary employment accounts for 26.6%. According to the Labor 
Force Survey, a nationally representative survey conducted by Japanese government, the 
corresponding statistic is 28.7%, supporting the representativeness of our survey data. 
However, it should be noted that 51.8% of respondents are university graduates, while the 
School Basic Survey predicts 35.7% for these birth cohorts. This suggests that our dataset 
may oversample those with higher socio-economic status. 
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 Source: https://www.tsr-net.co.jp/news/status/monthly/index.html  
Figure A1: The Trend in Bankruptcy Cases: Jan 2019 – Mar 2020 
 
 Source: https://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/sokuhou/tsuki/index.html  
Figure A2: The Trend in Unemployment Rate: Jan 2019 – Mar 2020 
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Table A1: Prefecture and Respondent Characteristics 
 Obs. Mean S.D. 
Prefecture Characteristics    
Confirmed cases in the prefecture (per day)    
January 2020 2,637 0.011 0.024 
February 2020 2,637 0.306 0.441 
March 2020 2,637 1.705 1.905 
Bankruptcy cases (thousand cases)    
January 2020 2,637 0.039 0.039 
February 2020 2,637 0.035 0.041 
March 2020 2,637 0.040 0.045 
Job-openings- to-applicants ratio    
January 2020 2,637 1.532 0.263 
February 2020 2,637 1.496 0.269 
March 2020 2,637 1.439 0.253 
Respondent Characteristics    
Age  2,624 40.635 5.747 
Female  2,634 0.498  
Live with schooling-age child 2,598 0.291  
Schooling 2,608   
  High school or lower  0.223  
  Vocational/ Jr college  0.259  
University or higher  0.518  
Socio-Economic Characteristics    
Suitability of job for teleworking 2,103 0.229 0.325 
Occupation 2,616   
Executive / Self-employed   0.093  
Regular employment  0.539  
Temporary employment  0.195  
Homemaker  0.115  
  No job  0.040  
  Others  0.018  
Income 2,283 3.526 1.433 
(1) Less than 2 million, (2) 2 - 4 million, (3) 4 - 6 million, (4) 6 - 8 million, 
(5) 8 - 10 million, (6) More than 10 million     
Read newspaper 2,613 1.866 1.242 
(1) Rarely, (2) 1-3/week, (3) 4-6/week, (4) Daily    
Read web newspaper 2,616 2.077 1.297 
(1) Rarely, (2) 1-3/week, (3) 4-6/week, (4) Daily    
Watch TV news 2,629 3.412 1.009 
(1) Rarely, (2) 1-3/week, (3) 4-6/week, (4) Daily    
Estimate of the actual number of infected people in Japan (x 103) 2,588 3.910 2.135 
(1) Less than 2,000, (2) 2,001-5,000, (3) 5,001-20,000, (4) More than 20,000    
COVID-19 causes serious problems for self 2,632 4.072 0.997 
(1) No, (2) Weakly No, (3) Neutral, (4) Weakly Yes, (5) Yes    
The situation will be even worse after 6 months 2,624 1.842 1.166 
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(1) No, (2) Weakly No, (3) Neutral, (4) Weakly Yes, (5) Yes    
Precipitation probability above which you would carry an umbrella (%) 2,637 51.600 19.468 
Which of these sayings characterizes you better?  2,600 2.495 1.293 
(A) Nothing ventured, nothing gained  (B) A wise man never courts danger    
(1) B, (2) Lean B, (3) Neutral, (4) Lean A, (5) A    
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted? 2,097 3.048 1.059 
(1) No, (2) Weakly No, (3) Neutral, (4) Weakly Yes, (5) Yes    
It is important to do something for the good of society. 2,093 3.530 0.984 
(1) No, (2) Weakly No, (3) Neutral, (4) Weakly Yes, (5) Yes    
It is important to help people nearby and care for their well-being 2,096 3.633 0.979 
(1) No, (2) Weakly No, (3) Neutral, (4) Weakly Yes, (5) Yes    
It is important to always behave properly. 2,096 4.141 0.881 
(1) No, (2) Weakly No, (3) Neutral, (4) Weakly Yes, (5) Yes    
It is important to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong. 2,097 3.063 1.001 
(1) No, (2) Weakly No, (3) Neutral, (4) Weakly Yes, (5) Yes    
I often donate. 2,098 2.327 1.090 
(1) No, (2) Weakly No, (3) Neutral, (4) Weakly Yes, (5) Yes    
Tried to buy masks more than usual? (1) Yes, (0) No 2,610 0.500 0.500 
Tried to buy disinfectant soaps more than usual? (1) Yes, (0) No 2,604 0.321 0.467 
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Table A2: Falsification Test 
 Conversation Commute Dining  (1) (2) (3) 
January 0.006   
 (0.007)   February -0.014 0.001 -0.036*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) 
January x -0.001   
Confirmed cases in March (0.002)   
February x -0.002 -0.003 0.001 
Confirmed cases in March (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
January x -0.001   
Confirmed cases in adjacent prefectures in March (0.002)   
February x  -0.001 -0.001 0.003 
Confirmed cases in adjacent prefectures in March (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant 0.535*** 0.246*** 0.484*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.529 0.243 0.472 
P-values of F-test for joint significance of 
interaction terms 0.904 0.173 0.152 
Observations 7,827 5,203 5,236 
Number of respondents 2,611 2,617 2,623 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table A3: The Impact of Infection Spread on Economic Conditions 
 Bankruptcies 
Job-openings- to-
applicants ratio 
 (1) (2) 
Confirmed cases 0.696 0.00012 
 (1.544) (0.00423) Monthly FE Yes Yes 
Prefecture FE Yes Yes 
Mean Dep. Var. 15.35 1.42 
Observations 141 141 
Number of prefectures 47 47 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A4: Using the Cumulative Number of Confirmed Cases 
 Conversation Commute Dining Sample: All No child All No child All No child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cumulative number of  -0.423*** -0.441*** -0.249** -0.307** -0.225 -0.223 
confirmed cases (0.134) (0.159) (0.103) (0.128) (0.138) (0.149) 
Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other prefecture characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.518 0.486 0.235 0.249 0.458 0.464 
Observations 10,439 7,299 7,799 5,458 7,855 5,494 
Number of respondents 2,613 1,827 2,619 1,832 2,624 1,835 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Table A5: Exclusion of Unemployed Respondents 
 Conversation Commute Dining Sample: All No child All No child All No child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Confirmed cases -0.008** -0.008** -0.006** -0.007** -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other prefecture characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.585 0.551 0.261 0.279 0.476 0.484 
Observations 8,829 6,134 6,594 4,583 6,647 4,615 
Number of respondents 2,209 1,535 2,215 1,538 2,220 1,541 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A6: Categorical Dependent Variables 
OLS Conversation Commute Dining 
Sample: All No child All No child All No child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Confirmed cases -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.008* -0.010** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Prefecture FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Other prefecture characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,439 7,299 7,799 5,458 7,855 5,494 
Number of respondents 2,613 1,827 2,619 1,832 2,624 1,835 
       
Interval Regression Conversation Commute Dining 
Sample: All No child All No child All No child 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Confirmed cases -0.093*** -0.107*** -0.026*** -0.032*** -0.014* -0.018** 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Prefecture FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Other prefecture characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,439 7,299 7,799 5,458 7,855 5,494 
Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A7: The Association Between Education and Socio-Economic Characteristics 
(Full Sample) 
 
Suitability 
of job for 
teleworking 
Economic 
status 
Information 
access 
Risk 
perception 
Risk 
preference 
Social 
capital 
Alternative 
protective 
measures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
University  -0.084*** 0.725*** 0.261*** 0.202*** -0.079* 0.503*** 0.161*** 
 (0.020) (0.049) (0.057) (0.053) (0.040) (0.068) (0.051) Vocational -0.047* 0.235*** 0.181*** 0.078 -0.044 0.432*** 0.201*** 
 (0.026) (0.046) (0.055) (0.058) (0.050) (0.086) (0.060) Age  -0.001 -0.000 0.028*** 0.007** -0.005 0.005 -0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) Female  0.170*** -0.720*** -0.174*** -0.105*** -0.269*** 0.260*** 0.469*** 
 (0.019) (0.056) (0.062) (0.034) (0.033) (0.064) (0.049) 
Live with  -0.022 0.240*** 0.220*** 0.004 0.057 0.322*** 0.217*** 
schooling-age child (0.017) (0.054) (0.045) (0.046) (0.054) (0.087) (0.037) 
Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,054 2,256 2,543 2,524 2,536 2,038 2,534 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the prefecture level are in 
parentheses. The sample sizes of Columns (1) and (6) are smaller than the others, because 
the data on respondents’ occupation and social capital were collected in the second-wave 
survey. Column (2) also has a small sample size due to missing values for annual income. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table A8: Heterogeneous Effect Model Using the Sample of Table 4 
  Conversation Commute Dining 
Sample: All No child All No child All No child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Confirmed cases -0.012* -0.015** -0.012** -0.016** -0.005 0.002 
  x University (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Confirmed cases -0.017* -0.022** -0.011 -0.010 -0.003 0.005 
  x Vocational (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Confirmed cases -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001* 0.000 -0.000 
  x Age (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Confirmed cases -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.021*** -0.012** 
  x Female (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Confirmed cases -0.013**  -0.002  -0.020**  
  x Live with schooling-age child (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.009)  
Month-Prefecture Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.530 0.495 0.244 0.260 0.465 0.471 
Observations 6,912 4,897 5,175 3,670 5,196 3,684 
Number of respondents 1,738 1,230 1,739 1,232 1,740 1,233 
The OLS coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
